![]() ![]() Both drive the same goal: the inclusive, equitable and qualitative development of human well-being. ![]() Human rights and development should not be viewed or pursued as separate ends in themselves – competing objectives for separate organisations or programmes – but as mutually reinforcing. However, the economic argument remains largely neglected and certainly under-emphasized. The paper closes with a call to strengthen social capabilities and state capacities to consolidate the union between development and human rights.Ĭredence is broadly given to the moral argument for including human rights within a development framework. The second section analyses the controversy regarding the existence of genuine “universal” human rights followed by considering whether human rights are mere aspirations or genuine rights – exposing the difficulty of monitoring, evaluating, and enforcing adherence to human rights mandates, particularly given the growth of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations (MNCs)/transnational corporations (TNCs). The paper begins by exploring the historical and contemporary understanding of the relationship between development and human rights – arguing for the increasing recognition of their mutually reinforcing relationship. This leads to three subsidiary objectives: demonstrating the mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights and development considering the practical divide between having and exercising a right understanding the impact of non-state actors and emphasising the ways in which state capacity and social capabilities need to be enhanced to both transform the consideration of human rights into a meaningful development catalyst and treat development as a significant contributor to human rights endeavours. The purpose of this paper is to engender new thinking regarding the intersection between universal human rights and development, and associated programmes. For this purpose the article develops a socio-legal account on social norm-creation that bridges moral universality and legal universality via ethical pluralism, which in effect explains why despite the universality of moral principles, the outcomes of ethical rationales can vary extremely. In order to shed some light on the universality debate, I will show how moral principles translate into ethical norms and might manifest through communicative action in human rights law. This will explain why ethical norms contain some universal principles, but are largely culturally specific. Ethical norms, I will argue, are rules that develop in social groups to put into effect moral principles through communicative action and therefore develop as culturally specific norms, which guide behaviour within these social groups. These needs are the universal grammar for moral principles, which will be distinguished from ethical norms. In the form of a multidisciplinary reflexive survey, the aim of this article is to show how human rights discourses derive from more basic principles related to basic needs. The question of the universality of human rights has much in common with the question of the universality of ethics. And in a way this helps to make the case for the universality of human rights. In a way our rights give us our dignity, not vice versa. ![]() On the strength of this discussion I suggest an inversion of the relationship that is often thought to hold between human rights and human dignity. I try to show how the two readings can be driven apart, how the universality of human rights need not be undermined merely by there being no adequate universalistic case for them. He offers a (more or less) universalistic case for (more or less) universalistic rights. Are we speaking of who has the rights (A has them if and only if he or she is human) or why they have the rights (A has them because and only because he or she is human)? Griffin brings the two readings together, as two sides of the same coin. I ask, in particular, how we are to read the words 'simply in virtue of'. ![]() In this paper I raise some questions about the familiar claim, recently reiterated by James Griffin, that human rights are rights that humans have 'simply in virtue of being human'. ![]()
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